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I. Serious Ontology, Deflationism and Fictionalism
Some ontologists take their work very seriously. They aim to discover the fundamental truths of
reality, to figure out how the world is and what is in it, by way of a priori reflection and
argumentation. Such philosophers are serious ontologists.2 Their seriousness is reflective of the
attitude they take towards the metaphysical conclusions they endorse, the dialectical landscape
they accept, including the ground rules for philosophical debate and available moves in logical
space. They may not agree with their opponents’ views, but they nonetheless think that it is
well worth the effort to sit down with them and debate about why not.
Let’s identify three distinguishing features of the serious ontologist. First, serious ontologists are
proposing ontological theories. They present and defend theories about the world with the aim
of getting it right. There is an assumption of match, correctness, truth, or accuracy. In tandem
with this assumption of accuracy is the second feature: the assumption that the world is in fact
a certain way. It’s an assumption that there’s a fact of the matter about the world.3 Third, there
3 Some might say this is just ontological realism at the meta-ontological level. That roughly captures the views I
have in mind, but not entirely. After all, some may claim that - as ontologists - we (i) propose theories about the
world with the aim of getting it right and (ii) the world may be a certain way which explains, in part, how the theory
can get it right, but they may also claim that (iii) accomplishing (i) and (ii) is utterly trivial. In short, the delfationists
I have in mind may very well include meta-ontological realists themselves who think that their brand of realism
isn’t really all that metaphysically deep or interesting. Chalmers (2009) calls such views 'lightweight realism.’ Hirsch
(2002), (2011) uses the term ‘shallow ontologist.’ These are not serious ontologists as I am understanding them
here.
2 Terminology borrowed from Thomasson (2009) and Jenkins (2014). Jenkins defines “serious ontological debates”
as those that are “neither trivially easy to solve nor merely verbal.” (p. 454) This way of capturing the relevant class
of ontologists isn’t quite right for my purposes here, as it would include deflationists such as Thomasson (2017),
who diagnoses certain ontological debates as verbal but valuable. Thomasson thinks that certain ontological
debates are neither trivially true nor merely verbal, yet she also takes a deflationary stance towards such debates in
that she thinks that they do not involve metaphysical or philosophical issues. In order to capture this kind of
deflationary view (among others), my understanding of ‘serious ontologists’ will differ.
1 Many thanks to Tamas Demeter, Ted Parent, and Adam Toon for organizing two conferences on Mental
Fictionalism: one at the University of Edinburgh in Edinburgh, Scotland (2014) and the other at the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences in Budapest, Hungary (2019). Helpful feedback from audience members and participants at
both events helped hone the ideas and arguments in this paper. Much gratitude is also owed to all of those
involved in this present volume, contributors and editors alike. Thanks also to Tim Sundell and Ted Parent for
personal discussion and comments.
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is a shared attitude that these ontologists have towards what they are doing, the
methodological practices in place, and the aims of doing metaphysics more broadly. They take
their projects to be philosophically important. We might even go so far as to say that it is a kind
of value judgement about the metaphysical oomph of their claims about the world.4 Serious
ontologists take the conclusions that they endorse and the activity they are engaged as being
metaphysically important.
In contrast, certain deflationists insist that many ontological debates are merely verbal, trivial,
nonsensical, off-topic, or pragmatic.5 These deflationists maintain that there is something
deeply wrong with serious ontological debates - either with the questions being asked or in the
answers being given. For my purposes here, the crucial unifying feature of these deflationary
critiques is the rejection of the claim that debates about these topics are in any way
philosophically substantial. Carnap (1950), Hirsch (2011), and Thomasson (2017) are three
examples of proponents of this kind of deflationism. They all agree - for one reason or another -
that the arguments and conclusions endorsed by serious ontologists are decidedly not
metaphysically important.
Such deflationists typically direct their complaints toward a certain subset of metaphysical
inquiry, not metaphysics-at-large or ontology as an entire discipline. Some direct their
complaints toward discussions over ordinary, humdrum objects such as tables, chairs, statues,
cats, or persons. Others complain about debates involving ontological oddballs such as
mereological sums, numbers, properties, classes, propositions, and so on. Yet as useful as it may
be to recognize which ontological debates are in fact targeted by such deflationists, it is also
illuminating to see which debates are not. Notably, what’s missing are ontological debates
involving consciousness or mental entities. This absence is curious. According to their own
deflationary criteria, ontological debate about consciousness or mental entities should qualify
as a candidate subject to their critiques. Yet they aren’t.6 Why not?
6 There are exceptions. Sidelle (2007) explicitly discusses disputes in philosophy of mind and suggests that certain
debates, such as those between identity theorists and functionalists, may be open to deflationary critiques, and
uses this particular debate as a “philosophical case study.” Sidelle categorizes disputes in philosophy of mind as one
subcategory (of many) under a broader class of disagreements, so his aim is much broader in scope than some of
the views I consider here. Sidelle also doesn’t insist that these disputes are in fact verbal, but rather that it “can be
legitimately asked whether they are...” (84) His project is fairly exploratory and non-committal relative to the other
deflationary views I will be examining in this paper; his discussion will not be part of my focus.
5 Bennett (2009) uses ‘dismissivism’ instead of ‘deflationist’ to characterize the generalized view that there is
“something deeply wrong” with certain ontological debates. Her interest concerns the motivations behind the
deflationist position, however, and her primary aims in that paper do not entirely align with mine here. So I will
stick with using the term ‘deflationism’ since it better suits my purposes.
4 These views roughly align with what Chalmers (2009) has called ‘heavyweight realism’, and what Manley (2009)
has called ‘mainstream metaphysics,’ although some details differ.
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Is it that debates in the metaphysics of mind do not involve participants taking ontological
issues seriously? Clearly not. Is there a mind? Is it material or immaterial? What is the relation
between the mind and the body? Are mental events or properties reducible to physical events or
properties? Are our subjective first-person experiences reducible to empiricist-friendly objective
facts? These are basic, familiar questions in philosophy of mind that involve deep questions
about existence, about what there is or isn’t, and about the metaphysical make up of what
certain entities are like. Such questions have been (and still are) taken to be metaphysically
meaningful by many who engage in debate about these topics.
So is it plausible that those engaged in debate about the mind or mentality are deeply mistaken
in their assumption that the ontological issues in philosophy of mind are really worth arguing
about? After all - and as we shall see - according to the deflationists’ own criteria, many
ontological debates in philosophy of mind share certain salient features with other debates
that, deflationists argue, are susceptible to their critiques. Surely that is reason enough to merit
further investigation into the depth (or shallowness) of disputes about mentality.
In what follows, I examine three meta-ontological deflationary approaches and apply them to
ontological debates in philosophy of mind. An intriguing consequence of this, I argue, is that it
leads to systematic problems for deflationism - specifically, problems of cognitive collapse. This
should be surprising: cognitive collapse problems are usually reserved for serious ontological
views such as eliminative materialism and mental fictionalism, not deflationism.
Mental fictionalism is the thesis that we are (or should be) fictionalists about mentality.
Statements made about the mind, consciousness, or whatever it is that is going on inside our
heads are not literally true, the mental fictionalism claims; rather, they are fictionally true. Such
talk, despite being strictly speaking false, is nonetheless useful and should be kept in use.7
Mental fictionalism may seem an odd fit for a paper about serious ontology and deflationism.
After all, fictionalists in general may seem to be neither quite deflationist (they take an
ontological stance, if speaking literally) nor serious (they avoid an ontological stance, if speaking
7 For my purposes here, I am interested in mental fictionalist accounts that have both an ontological thesis and a
linguistic thesis. The ontological thesis is either eliminativist or agnostic with respect to mentalistic entities (or
whatever entities are presupposed by folk psychology). The linguistic thesis is a claim about the mentalistic
language - the folk psychological discourse - and avows certain non-truth-aiming virtues for it. Perhaps, like Lewis
(1978), the linguistic thesis involves appeal to hidden fictional operators. Perhaps, like Walton (1990), utterances in
the folk psychological fiction involve some kind of subtle pretense and are only pseudo-statements. Options
abound. What matters is that the mental fictionalist view explicitly separates our talk of mentalistic entities from
our ontological commitments to them. See Wallace (this volume) and (2016), e.g.
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fictionally). It may also be thought that fictionalism is just a kind of deflationary position, or that
the distinction between deflationism and fictionalism is negligible. Indeed, even Carnap (1950),
while arguing for a meta-ontological deflationary view, claims that one of his primary goals is to
show how using a language that refers to certain metaphysically suspicious entities - abstracta
such as numbers, properties, etc. - can nonetheless be “perfectly compatible with empiricism
and strictly scientific thinking.” (Carnap 1950, p.21) This certainly seems to be the fictionalist’s
aim, too: finding a way to separate our ontological discourse from our ontological
commitments.
Nonetheless, my focus here involves serious ontologists who propose theories about the world,
who assume that the world is in fact a certain way such that a theory about the world could get
it right, and assume that engaging in discussions about both of these things is metaphysically
important. Generally, fictionalists tend to meet these three conditions. A fictionalist about X is
often motivated by the assumption that discourse about Xs is ontologically committing. Yet she
also admits that ontological commitment to Xs is somehow problematic, even though discourse
about X is  indispensable. This last point is crucial. The fictionalist does not think that debate
about X is shallow, silly, or pointless; on the contrary, she endorses X-talk. She thinks that talk
about Xs is so important that, despite the fact that many claims about Xs are strictly speaking
false, X-talk should nonetheless continue.
One might be tempted to draw a distinction between first-order talk about Xs and second-order
meta-ontological debate about the existence of Xs. Perhaps, one might argue, a fictionalist
endorses the former but is happy to reject the latter. This seems implausible. Fictionalism (as I
am understanding it) consists of a linguistic thesis and an ontological thesis. Where does the
ontological thesis come from? Presumably it comes from discussion about the very entities that
the fictionalist is fictionalist about. So, she must think that discussion about the existence of Xs
is worth the trouble of doing, since she eventually comes to some conclusion about it (even if
it’s an epistemically cautious one - i.e., agnosticism about Xs). Put another way: that the
fictionalist about Xs has an ontological stance about Xs indicates that she thinks that discussion
about the existence of Xs is worthwhile - at least, worthwhile enough to come to a particular
conclusion about the ontological status of Xs.
It is very often because fictionalists assume that certain metaphysical debates are substantial
and worth doing that they are motivated to embrace the fictionalist view that they favor. They
very often start from an assumption of Quinean meta-ontological methodology, which
maintains that any ontologically committing language is worth investigating both in and of itself
(to see if what our ontological commitments are) and in consideration of its integration with
other theories (as part of its potential fit into our best overall theory of the world). Fictionalism,
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as oddly as it may seem, is one way to take ontology seriously. Consequently, deflationary
critiques against serious ontological debates are ipso facto critiques against fictionalism.8
Here is the plan. Section II examines meta-ontological deflationism as applied to mentality. I
examine three deflationary views, one by one: Carnap’s (1950) framework proposal, Hirsch’s
(2011) verbal dispute thesis, and Thomasson’s (2017) metalinguistic negotiation view.9 I apply
each of them to ontological debates in philosophy of mind, and show how this leads to
systematic cognitive collapse. Throughout this discussion, I discuss the advantages of mental
fictionalism over deflationism with respect to these worries. In section III, I explain why
deflationism about mentality leads to systematic collapse, and expand on why mental
fictionalism is in principle better equipped to address collapsing problems than deflationism is.
II. Mental Deflationism
i. The Folk Psychological Framework
Carnap (1950) is interested in explaining why existence questions as asked by the ontologist are
misguided or confused. In particular, he is interested in ontological debates concerning
abstracta - numbers, properties, propositions, and so on. He aims to show how we can accept a
language that seemingly quantifies over abstract entities and yet still adhere to our
“nominalistic scruples.” We can do this, Carnap proposes, by properly understanding the
distinction between internal and external questions with respect to linguistic frameworks. If we
are asking internal questions relative to a framework, then the answers are straightforward,
easy, or trivial, making the questions relatively uninteresting - and not worth asking. If we are
asking external questions relative to this framework, then the answers are meaningless,
nonsensical, or merely practical, making the questions non-theoretical at best - and
(metaphysically) not worth asking.
Carnap proceeds by a strategy of examples. He provides a healthy sample of frameworks - the
world of things, the system of numbers, the framework of propositions, the framework of thing
properties, and so on - and then outlines what each framework looks like, the seeming
9 Thomasson’s (2017) deflationism is distinct from the ‘easy ontology’ deflationism she defends in Thomasson
(2009), (2015), etc.
8 To be clear, my primary focus here will be on mental fictionalism. I aim to show how the mental fictionalist has
the resources to avoid cognitive collapse, while the mental deflationist does not. Yet - as we will see - some of what
I say can be carried over to eliminative materialism, too.
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commitments involved in accepting them, and various internal and external questions relative
to each. This suggests a helpful diagnostic going forward. For any area of ontological dispute
about Xs, we can suppose that there is a relevant framework with new vocabulary and rules -
the X-framework. We can then ask ourselves: Are existence questions about X internal or
external to the X-framework? If they are internal, then the answers can be determined either
empirically or logically, depending on whether the X-framework is factual or theoretical,
respectively (Carnap 1950, p.22). If the questions are external - if the questions are about
whether Xs exist in some sense that is distinct from “Is X an element of the X-framework?” -
then either the question is absurd and meaningless, or else it is a mere practical question about
whether we should adopt the X-framework. Whatever our answers, we either have a
straightforward diagnosis about the existence of Xs, or we have an explanation about why the
question is either malformed or merely practical. Importantly, in no case are the questions (or
answers) theoretical or deeply philosophical.
So let’s consider the folk psychological framework. This framework is similar to Carnap’s world
of things framework in that it is concerned with everyday language. It includes the ordinary,
everyday talk of whatever is going on inside our heads - our thoughts, beliefs, desires, choices,
intentions, etc. Given how commonplace this framework is, it may be considered the mental
correlate of the world of things framework. Ordinary folk use this language and talk this way all
of the time to describe the contents of our own heads. We have all accepted this framework
early on in our lives. Many of us (unless we are philosophers) do not even bother asking
ourselves whether we should accept this framework or not. We merely find ourselves having
already accepted it.
Once we have the folk psychological framework in place, can we use it as a way to capture the
ontological questions in philosophy of mind? It initially seems so. The mind/body debate, as far
as the disputes between material monists and dualists go, is nicely analogous to disputes
between nominalists and Platonists with respect to abstract entities. Canrap’s stated purpose is
to show that using a particular language that seemingly commits to abstract entities does not in
fact commit us to such things in our ontology. So we should be able to use his deflationary
approach to show how we can, in principle, use a language that seemingly commits to dualistic
or non-empiricist mentalistic entities without thereby in fact committing ourselves to such
entities.
According to framework deflationism, here is how the process works: first, we suppose that an
individual wishes to speak about a new kind of entity. In order to do so, they introduce a new
framework, “a system of new ways of speaking, subject to new rules.” (Carnap 1950, p. 21)
Others can then accept the framework or not, depending on what she wants to do, which may
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come down to a practical decision about the utility of doing so. There may be some
deliberation, but in the end we are free to choose whether to accept a framework or not. With
this framework in place, we can then raise questions relative to it, which we can intend to be
either internally or externally understood.
Perhaps now we start to see a problem. The action items involved in the framework procedure,
indicated by italics, are taken nearly directly from Carnap himself. This is the process that’s
described. It’s how frameworks are constructed, how we respond to them, how we ask
questions in light of them, etc. Yet, importantly, this description involves folk psychological
notions. In order to have a clear description of what frameworks are and how they work, we
have to assume certain folk psychological notions such as what the speaker desires, wishes,
intends, chooses, etc. Yet if these folk psychological notions are a prerequisite for framework
acceptance, how is acceptance of the folk psychological framework coherent?
Let’s tread carefully. Carnap explicitly denies that in accepting a framework we are then
committed to an “acceptance of a belief in the reality” of whatever entities that framework is
about (Carnap 1950, p.23, emphasis his). So, for example, if the system of numbers says “there
are infinitely many prime numbers”, then in accepting this framework we are not thereby
committed to believing in the reality of infinitely many prime numbers. We can accept the
framework without thereby acquiring a belief that the entities circumscribed by the framework
exist in some robust, external sense. But note that this is a claim about the connection (or
rather: disconnection) between accepting a framework and having or acquiring a belief about
the existence of the entities described by the framework. In contrast, the problem I am
interested in is whether, in accepting a framework, we are presupposing mentalistic activity at
all. Put another way: Is the process of accepting a framework itself a mentalistic activity? If it
isn’t, then what exactly is it? If it is, then the folk psychological framework seems problematic.
In response to the ontologist who maintains that certain existence questions must be answered
prior to the adoption of a framework, Carnap explains that activities such as accepting a
framework are merely a way of adopting a new language, or a new way of describing things, not
the adoption of new beliefs about how things really are. Moreover, any question prior to
accepting the framework about whether we should accept it is a practical question, not
theoretical.10
10 “...the introduction of the new ways of speaking does not need any theoretical justification because it does not
imply any assertion of reality. We may still speak...of ‘the acceptance of the framework’ or ‘the acceptance of the
new entities’ since this form of speech is customary; but one must keep in mind that these phrases do not mean for
us anything more than acceptance of the new linguistic forms. Above all, they must not be interpreted as referring
to an assumption, belief, or assertion of ‘the reality of the entities’. There is no such assertion. An alleged
statement of the reality of the framework of entities is a pseudo-statement without cognitive content. To be sure,
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Ok, fine. But the acceptance of a framework is still an activity. So what is this activity? And what
is it in relation to the folk psychological framework? Carnap says that acceptance of a
framework is a judgement, but without cognitive content. Perhaps it is something like entertain
or presuppose or whatever it is that is not quite belief and is perhaps also non-propositional.
Perhaps it is a kind of knowledge-how or skill acquisition state or some emotive, non-cognitive
mental attitude. We don’t need to specify what it is exactly, so long as we are careful about
what it is not. And, importantly, we can easily grant that any alleged ‘statement’ about the
reality of the framework entities is a pseudo-statement without cognitive content while also
acknowledging that the act in accepting this pseudo-statement is itself a mentalistic activity.
If accepting a framework is not a mentalistic activity, then what else could it be? What exactly
are we doing when we accept a framework? Is it exercise? Is it bodily movement in space? Are
we looking at a work of art? Evaluating it aesthetically but non-propositionally? Is it something
that animals can do? Is it something that my smartphone can do? Presumably, no; it’s none of
these things. It is an activity that we (human beings?) engage in as a response to a linguistic
framework before us.11 One may be tempted to explain: these frameworks are themselves an
(abstract?) new language with new rules that someone constructs and introduces for the
purpose of having a new way of speaking, to describe a new kind of thing. Yet all of these
actions seem to presuppose folk psychological notions - understanding and constructing a
language, intending it to mean or describe things in a certain way, etc. So, whatever it is that
accepting a framework involves, it is at the very least some kind of mentalistic activity, as
understood by folk psychology. But then the activity of accepting a framework presupposes folk
psychological notions.
This may be fine in most cases, and for most frameworks. There is no incoherence, for example,
in presupposing folk psychological notions when we explain how it is that we accept the world
of things framework, or the system of numbers framework, and so on. But it is thoroughly
problematic to try to explain the activity of accepting the folk psychological framework when
the activity of acceptance itself presupposes those very folk psychological notions.
11 And even this talk of ‘before us’ is metaphorical; frameworks are not paintings in a gallery. So what are they? And
what are we doing when we contemplate, accept, or reject them?
we have to face at this point an important question; but it is a practical, not a theoretical question; it is the
question of whether or not to accept the new linguistic forms. The acceptance cannot be judged as being either
true or false because it is not an assertion. It can only be judged as being more or less expedient, fruitful, conducive
to the aim for which the language is intended. Judgments of this kind supply the motivation for the decision of
accepting or rejecting the framework.” (Carnap 1950, pp.31-32)
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To be clear, the conflict comes from what we are doing, not what we believe. So we can agree
with Carnap that no one is committed to believing in the existence of folk psychological notions
when they accept the folk psychological framework. But we are nonetheless committed to
engaging in folk psychological activities when accepting the folk psychological framework.
Furthermore, just because some activity is pragmatic or non-theoretical does not mean that it is
non-mentalistic, or free from folk psychological notions. So it won’t help to appeal to the
pragmatic nature of the process of framework acceptance.
Again: unlike the ontologist who Carnap responds to, I am not insisting that certain existence
questions must be answered prior to the adoption of a framework. Rather, I am insisting that
certain activities must be accounted for prior to the adoption of a framework. In particular, our
mentalistic activities, circumscribed by the folk psychological framework, must be accounted for
prior to adoption of this very framework. But this, in essence, is to adopt the framework before
we’ve adopted the framework, which is nonsensical.
Perhaps the reason Carnap’s deflationary views have not, in fact, been applied to ontological
questions in philosophy of mind is that it is incoherent to do so. Not incoherent in the way that,
according to Carnap, asking theoretical (non-practical) external questions are, but incoherent as
in: conceptually undermining. This kind of incoherence may sound familiar - it is similar to
“cognitive collapse” or “cognitive suicide” worries launched against eliminative materialists and
mental fictionalists.12 Let’s take a moment to review arguments from cognitive collapse in order
to clarify how such arguments apply to mental deflationism, too.
ii. Cognitive Collapse
Mental fictionalists (when speaking strictly) are often eliminative materialists at heart: they
deny the existence of - or are agnostic about - the entities described by folk psychology. Many
mental fictionalists are sympathetic with the eliminativist’s claim that folk psychology is a sloppy
or outdated theory that is very likely false. They also very often agree with the eliminativist that
the ultimate true theory - the accurate, literal description of the reality of the world - is much
more scientifically rigorous than folk psychology, and is very likely still in progress. This is their
ontological thesis. However, unlike the eliminative materialist, the mental fictionalist does not
think that we should thereby abandon folk psychology. She does not think that we should stop
talking about beliefs, desires, etc., and whatever it is that ordinary folk say is going on inside our
heads. Folk psychology, however flawed and false, is also incredibly useful - indispensably so. It
12 See Baker (1987), (1988), Boghossian (1990), Reppert (1992), etc. for discussion of collapsing arguments against
eliminative materialism. See Parent (2013) and Wallace (2016) for discussion of collapsing arguments against
mental fictionalism.
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is a helpful fiction that boasts many other virtues besides truth. As such, it should be kept in use
and treated as a mental fiction. This is her linguistic thesis.
Against mental fictionalism, the argument from cognitive collapse is roughly this: in order to
propose her theory, argue for her conclusions, to object to competing theories, to generally
engage in philosophical debate at all, the mental fictionalist must presuppose the very thing she
is, when speaking strictly, eliminativist about. She has to propose her theory, believe certain
propositions, disbelieve others, argue for her thesis, etc. - all of which are folk psychological
activities - the very things the mental fictionalist insists do not exist. Moreover, the mental
fictionalist proposes that we treat folk psychological discourse as a fiction - something false but
valuable. Yet the notion of a fiction also presupposes folk psychological notions. To engage with
a fiction, we entertain it, we imagine, we presuppose, we pretend. These are all folk
psychological concepts. So the mental fictionalist cannot propose either her ontological or her
linguistic thesis, for doing so presupposes the very things she claims do not exist. The very thing
she describes us doing - engaging in a folk psychological fiction - when it seems as if we are
genuinely participating in mentalistic activity, presupposes the legitimacy of mentalistic activity.
This is the problem of cognitive collapse.
Yet notice that the collapsing problem that I’ve raised for the framework deflationist is much
worse than the collapse worries facing the mental fictionalist. One of the defining features of
the deflationary position is that it does not take an ontological stance with respect to the
ontological issues at hand. Carnap is very clear that his framework deflationism does not need
to take an ontological stance - or commit to any existence claims - prior to the adoption of a
framework. This is (in part) why it is deflationary. But nevermind the ontological, existence
claims. What are we doing when we accept the folk psychological framework? What are we
doing prior to accepting it? The fact that there is no answer here - or, that the answer only
makes sense once we’ve presupposed a framework - suggests that cognitive collapse worries
are particularly thorny for the deflationist.
In contrast, for the mental fictionalist, there is an answer as to what is going on when we are
engaging in the mental fiction. Indeed, there are two answers - one literal, one fictional. The
literal, strict answer involves a description about whatever non-psychological activities are
occurring when we make noises, flap our mouths, wave our arms, gesticulate at powerpoints,
and otherwise exchange audible murmurings with fellow philosophers. This literal answer will
not involve any reference to folk psychological entities or activities, and it will likely only appeal
to empiricist-friendly observable behavior or scientifically respectable neural activity. But we
will nonetheless have an explanation for the event taking place when it seems for all the world
that we are engaged in the very folk psychological activities that the mental fictionalist
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(speaking strictly) denies exists. Moreover, the mental fictionalist also has a nonliteral, fictional
answer to describe this activity. This fictional answer will involve folk psychological notions. It
will include a description of the participants in a debate making statements, giving arguments,
defending claims, proposing beliefs and so on, in just the way you would expect a mental realist
to give. Only, according to the mental fictionalist, none of these descriptions or statements are
literally true or ontologically committing; it is merely a fiction.
One might think that this is problematic, since such an explanation presumes the coherence of a
fiction, which also presupposes mentalistic activity. But the mental fictionalist, when speaking
strictly, can have a non-psychological description about fictions and engagement with fiction
that involves the empiricist-friendly and scientifically respectable entities, events, or activities
she accepts. The mental fictionalist can give an account of fictions and our interactions with
fictions that is consistent with her mental eliminativist ontology. In this way, because the mental
fictionalist has an ontological claim - depending on the details of the view - cognitive collapse is
avoidable (Wallace 2016).
Yet this kind of move is in principle unavailable to the framework deflationist. Because the
framework deflationist doesn’t take an ontological stance - or rather, because she doesn’t think
there is one to be had - she doesn’t have an explanation as to what, exactly, is going on when
we accept the folk psychological framework. What’s more, those of us who are launching the
objection against the framework deflationist do not seem to be saddling the deflationsist with
commitments she herself does not already accept. Indeed, we’ve merely taken the framework
deflationist’s description of the framework process at face value, which already comes laden
with folk psychological terminology and activities.
As may be evident, I don’t think that the cognitive collapse worry is particularly troubling for
mental fictionalism.13 But this is because, so long as the mental fictionalist thinks that, strictly
speaking, something is going on when it seems as if we are engaging in folk psychological
behavior, including engaging with a fiction, she will have plenty of resources at her disposal to
avoid cognitive collapse. To put it another way, the mental fictionalist is only an eliminativist
about a small subsection of ontology: mentalistic entities. She is still an ontological realist
otherwise. She is, in line with the categories delineated at the outset of this paper, a serious
ontologist. So she can gain a solid foothold of reality somewhere to explain what is going on
when she is fictionally-but-not-literally engaging in folk psychological activities - i.e., making
statements, arguing for conclusions, proposing, holding, or defending beliefs, engaging with
fictions, etc. In this way, the argument from cognitive collapse fails to gain traction against the
mental fictionalist. To be sure, the argument is still important, even if it is not effective in
13 For similar reasons, I don’t think it’s particularly devastating for the eliminative materialist, either.
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undermining the view. For it puts pressure on the mental fictionalist to say something (more)
about what is literally going on when we are using folk psychological discourse. It forces her to
reaffirm her ontological position and give us more of a compelling story about how that fits up
with her linguistic thesis, and the folk psychological discourse she wants to keep in use as a
fiction.
Yet analogous moves are not available to the framework deflationist. The meta-ontological
deflationist by design does not take an ontological stance. Carnap’s framework deflationism in
particular is supposed to be a diagnosis of how language works, not how the world works. His
view, I take it, is supposed to show us that if we concentrate on words and language carefully,
we will see that ontological worries about the world will resolve themselves fairly
straightforwardly, or else we will have a satisfactory explanation for our confusion. But
investigating framework deflationism as it applies to ontological issues about mentality reveals
that this language-world divide diminishes. When it does, there is no obvious foothold to grab
onto here. The deflationist, unlike the mental fictionalist, does not have a non-folk-psychological
explanation for what is going on outside of the folk psychological framework. He doesn’t think
that something else is really going on when we are using the language of folk psychology,
because he doesn’t accept the legitimacy of the idea of “something else is really going on.”
That’s what being a deflationist is all about.
I had said at the outset that very often meta-ontological deflationists do not give deflating
arguments across the board, against metaphysics-at-large or ontology as an entire discipline.
Rather, they seem to aim their complaints at certain subsets of ontology, depending on their
particular interests. Carnap (1950) is primarily concerned with ontological debates about
abstracta, for example. Hirsch, as we shall see in a moment, is primarily concerned with
ontological debates about ordinary objects, and so on. Perhaps this fact can be of use here.
Perhaps the framework deflationist can appeal to whatever it is that she is not a deflationist
about to aid her response to objections from cognitive collapse. Perhaps she can somehow
non-circularly re-describe the activities and behavior involved in accepting the folk psychological
framework so that it is not subject to collapse. Or, perhaps she can find something malformed
about the cognitive collapse objection itself. Perhaps it begs the question against deflationism
at-large, or presupposes ontological realism to get it going, making it dialectically ineffective
against certain kinds of deflationism. But all of this remains to be seen. As is, the framework
deflationist is under pressure to say more, or somehow re-describe the activities and behavior
involved in accepting the folk psychological framework, on pain of cognitive collapse. Until then,
collapse remains a particularly formidable worry for the mental deflationist.
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I had mentioned in the introduction of this paper that cognitive collapse worries are a
systematic worry for mental deflationism. To show this, we first need to look at a couple of
more deflationary proposals. So let's move on to our second one: Hirsch’s verbal disputes
deflationism. Then we’ll look at Thomasson. My ultimate aim is to show how, in the wake of
cognitive collapse worries for mental deflationism, mental fictionalism emerges as an admirable
alternative theory of mind.
iii. Verbal Disputes and Disagreements about Mentality
Hirsch (2003), (2011) promotes quantifier variance and common sense. He criticizes
contemporary ontologists for endorsing theories about ordinary objects that no ordinary person
would likely understand or judge to be true. In particular, Hirsch aims to undermine revisionary
ontologists, who are defined by the endorsement of a worldview where “…many common
sense judgments about the existence or identity of highly visible physical objects are a priori
necessarily false.” (Hirsch 2011, p. 101) This includes the mereological nihilist, who says there
are no tables; the compositional universalist, who says there is an object composed of my cat
and my coffee mug; the temporal worm theorist, who says that only one small part of my coffee
mug is in front of me right now, and so on.14
Hirsch’s arguments explicitly appeal to a charitable presumption: the assumption that ordinary
speakers are not asserting necessary a priori falsehoods about ordinary objects. Importantly,
this is not a commitment to the claim that ordinary speakers always speak truly about anything
whatsoever. Speakers long ago uttered false statements such as “the earth is flat” or “whales
are fish.” Hirsch maintains that the most plausible interpretation of such speakers is not that
what they said is true, but rather that they had good reasons to believe their utterances (even
though they were false). Ordinary folk, Hirsch maintains, can have good reasons for, yet still be
wrong about, contingent, empirical claims about highly visible physical objects. This does not
include conceptual necessary a priori mistakes the common folk might make about, say,
mathematics or logic; the folk can certainly be wrong about these sorts of things. But they
14 Quick terminological note: as explained at the outset, my aim in this paper is the serious ontologist, not the
revisionary one. It is true that, very often, serious ontologists, after spending a lot of time arguing and debating
amongst themselves, end up endorsing worldviews that contradict common sense. Yet what makes someone a
serious ontologist is not the outrageousness of their claims. Indeed, some serious ontologists explicitly argue
against extraordinary ontologies, using our unremarkable, ordinary intuitions to support perfectly mild
metaphysical views. (See Korman (2016), e.g.) What I am interested in is not the extraordinariness of some
conclusion but rather the metaphysical importance the endorser of this conclusion takes her project to have.
Nonetheless, for the sake of simplifying the following exegetical portions, I will mostly stick with Hirsch’s
terminology of “revisionary ontologists” for the moment. There is enough overlap between the theorists we are
interested in for it not to make much difference in the section that follows.
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cannot be in massive widespread error about necessary a priori statements about ordinary
objects.
Hirsch’s principle of charity is supposed to be the language analogue of a Moorean move in
epistemology. A Moorean appeal to common sense knowledge is not decisive. It merely puts
epistemic pressure on us to weigh our convictions, pitting ordinary intuitions against all of the
premises in an argument that concludes anything to the contrary. Philosophical epistemic
principles that lead to absurd conclusions, such as radical skepticism, need to outweigh our
ordinary claims about knowledge, such as “I know I have hands.” Otherwise, it is the
philosophical principles that will be rejected, not common sense. Similarly, Hirsch’s appeal to a
principle of charity is not intended to be decisive; it merely puts linguistic pressure on us to
weigh our understanding of ordinary concepts against revisionary ones. Hirsch maintains that
any analysis of ‘object’, ‘thing’, or ‘table’ etc. that flies in the face of our ordinary notions, fails to
be an analysis of the very concepts under consideration. So, very often in ordinary object
ontology, the thing to go should be our highly theorized principles and analyses, not the original
concepts or terms we are trying to analyze or formulate principles about. If ordinary speakers
assert “The entire table is in the room”, then we are under some linguistic pressure to assume
that what they are saying is not necessary, a priori false, barring overriding reasons to the
contrary.
Given that Hirsch is interested in debates about highly visible ordinary objects such as tables
and trees, but not debates concerning necessary a priori conceptual matters involving abstracta
such as mathematics or logic, where does that leave you and me? You and I are at least
moderate-sized dry goods, even if, in order to account for consciousness or our inner mental
life, we are something else besides. Using Hirsch’s own criteria, do ontological debates involving
mentalistic entities count as merely verbal disputes? Can we coherently apply his verbal dispute
charge to ontological debates in philosophy of mind? If we can, what is the verdict?
One might think that proposals about the mentalistic entities circumscribed by folk psychology
will not qualify as revisionary in Hirsch’s sense because mental states, beliefs, desires, etc., are
not highly visible physical objects like tables and chairs. But why should visibility matter? Is it
because highly visible physical objects are more epistemically uncontestable than non-visible or
non-physical objects? That may be so when it comes to certain abstracta such as numbers or
properties or sets or sums. But internal mental states are, quite arguably, more certainly known
than any mind-independent physical object. Intuitively, we know with more certainty
propositions such as “I am in pain” or “it seems as if a table is in front of me” than we do
propositions such as “there is a table in front of me” or “my car is in the parking garage.” There
are plenty of good reasons why the content of our own mind - the Cartesian ego, the thing that
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thinks, reasons, wills, has opinions and so forth - is considered the foundation upon which we
build knowledge of the non-mental world. So, if the restriction to highly visible physical objects
is based on epistemic considerations, it seems Hirsch should be open to applying his brand of
deflationism to ontological disputes about the mind.
Furthermore, if Hirsch is primarily interested in deflationism by way of linguistic pressure, then
ordinary folk psychological discourse should have a similar status as ordinary object discourse.
Ordinary uses of folk psychological terms such as ‘belief’, ‘desire’, ‘pain,’ etc. seem just as
widespread and accepted as ordinary uses of object terms such as ‘table’, ‘chair,’ ‘thing,’ etc. A
charitable presumption of what we say about the content of our own heads will require an
interpretation that does not conclude that we are saying wildly false things all of the time. Thus,
one might argue, any analysis of folk psychological terms that flies in the face of ordinary usage
must fail to be an analysis of the very concepts under consideration. If ordinary speakers assert
“I believe the sky is blue”, then we are under some linguistic pressure to assume that what they
are saying is not necessary, a priori false, barring overriding reasons to the contrary.
Most importantly, however, disputes in the philosophy of mind seem to satisfy one of Hirsch’s
explicit diagnostic criteria:
“The simplest paradigm of a verbal dispute...is where, for each disputed sentence D,
there are two undisputed sentences, U1 and U2, one true and one false, such that one
side holds that D is (a priori necessarily) equivalent to U1 and the other side holds that D
is equivalent to U2.
To see how this paradigm is supposed to map onto (what Hirsch takes to be) a merely verbal
dispute, take the purported disagreement between the mereological nihilist and the
mereological universalist.15 Let us also assume that the universalist assumes that mereological
sums are ontologically innocent - i.e., that sums are nothing over and above the parts.16 The
nihilist claims that there are no composite tables, but grants that there are mereological
simples-arranged-tablewise. The universalist grants that there are composite tables (and
composite sums of tables and ducks, and so on), but she also grants that there are mereological
simples-arranged-tablewise. Given this, it seems we can characterize the debate as follows,
where the subscript “c” is to indicate a dispute about composition:
16 The most straightforward way to do this is to accept composition as identity, of which there are many different
types. See Baxter (1988), Lewis, (1991), Wallace (2011), etc.
15 The disputants need not be this extreme in their views. The example that follows will work just as well if the
disputants were the mereological nihilist and any kind of composite realist; the latter need not be a full-fledged
mereological universalist.
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Dc = There is a table in region R.
Uc1 = There are simples-arranged-tablewise, in R.
Uc2 = There is a sum composed of parts in addition to the simples, in R.
The disputed sentence, Dc, between the nihilist and universalist is “there is a table in front of
us.” The universalist says it is true; the nihilist says it is false. Meanwhile, Uc1 is undisputedly true
according to both sides: both agree that there are simples arranged in a table-like way. And,
presumably, both parties agree that Uc2 is indisputably false - although, admittedly, for different
reasons. The nihilist thinks there never are any sums, ipso facto, there aren’t any sums in region
R. The universalist, on the other hand, thinks that there aren’t any sums in addition to the parts.
That is, there are sums, but they aren’t something over and above the parts that are already
there.
So we’ve satisfied the template. According to Hirsch, this should indicate that we are in the
midst of a merely verbal dispute.17
My concerns here are not whether Hirsch’s criterion for verbal disputes are adequate but rather,
assuming that they are, would they apply to ontological disputes involving mentality? Putting it
another way, I want to know whether Hirsch, given his own criterion, would put disputes about
mentality in the same category as disputes about composition and tables. If he thinks that the
latter are merely verbal, then given his stated reasons for thinking so, should he think that
disputes about the mental are merely verbal as well?
Imagine that we have a dispute between an identity theorist and an eliminative materialist.18
The identity theorist is, of course, not a substance dualist, but she nonetheless thinks that folk
psychological utterances such as “Joe believes the sky is blue” are true. The identity theorist
believes that some (most) of our ordinary folk psychological claims are true, whereas the
eliminative materialist thinks that they are false. Using Hirsch’s paradigm, we might see if we
could characterize the debate between these disputants as follows, where the subscript “m” is
to indicate a dispute about mentality:
18 For comparison, consider Sidelle’s (2007) discussion of the identity theorist and the functionalist. Sidelle is
considering a slightly different verbal dispute than Hirsch (2011); his criteria rests on the fact that the identity
theorist and functionalist agree on all the empirical facts and which worlds (on some description) are possible.
(Sidelle 2007, p.95)
17 Bennett (2009) raises some objections to Hirsch’s criteria here, which I am sympathetic to. Her objections may
also be behind any forced awkwardness of the example - i.e., why Uc2 may not quite adequately capture what is
uncontroversially accepted as false between the nihilist and universalist. We may also worry whether there can
even be a diagnostic test, even in principle, to determine whether a certain debate is verbal. See Jenkins (2014a,
2014b), e.g. These issues, while important, are not relevant for my purposes here.
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Dm = Joe believes that the sky is blue.
Um1 = Joe’s brain is (participating) in a certain physical state, event, or activity.
Um2 = There is a mental event in addition to the physical state, event, or activity
occurring in Joe’s brain.
The disputed sentence, Dm, between the eliminativist and the identity theorist is “Joe believes
the sky is blue.” The identity theorist says it is true; the eliminativist says it is false. Meanwhile,
Um1 is undisputedly true according to both sides. Both agree that Joe’s brain is in a certain
physical state or is participating in some physical event or activity. Certain material facts, we can
assume, are not in dispute. Moreover, both parties agree that Um2 is false - although, admittedly,
for different reasons. The eliminativist thinks there are never any mentalistic activities or
events, ipso facto, there aren’t any mental events in addition to whatever is going on inside Joe.
The identity theorist thinks that there aren’t any mental events in addition to the physical
events occurring in Joe’s brain. There are beliefs, but these kinds of mental states aren’t
something over and above the physical stuff that is already there.
So we’ve satisfied the template. According to Hirsch, this should indicate that we are in the
midst of a merely verbal dispute. Thus, the identity theorist and eliminative materialist must
mean different things by “belief.” They must be speaking different languages, talking past each
other, not really disagreeing, etc. They are mistaken in thinking that they are engaged in a
genuine dispute.
However, notice that the issue is particularly tricky now that the topic is mentality. According to
Hirsch’s deflationist story, one disputant holds that Dm is equivalent to Um1, the other believes
that D is equivalent to Um2, both accept that Dm is true, but they think that it means different
things, and so on. This process supposedly shows that the disagreement is over word usage and
definitions, not ontology or metaphysics. It’s about words, not the world. But all of this activity -
the entire verbal deflationist explanation - presupposes mentalistic activity. According to
Hirsch’s own account, the description of what’s going on between the identity theorist and the
eliminative materialist presupposes folk psychological notions.
Here’s another way to put the point. Suppose the deflationist thinks that his deflationist
description of the debate is accurate - i.e., that the verbal deflationist theory of what’s going on
matches up with what is really going on, that it truly describes the events occuring between the
identity theorist and the eliminativist when they are debating about ontological proposals in
philosophy of mind.19 Then his view presupposes the existence of the very thing at issue:
19 I doubt he will do this, but more on that in a minute.
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mentalistic entities. In order to take the process of a verbal dispute at face value, as it is being
described by the verbal deflationist, certain folk psychological assumptions have to be made -
the very things under dispute. We can imagine that an eliminative materialist, for example, will
flat-out reject this picture as question-begging against her view!
When a dispute is assumed to be ontologically substantive, a common deflationist move is to
explain how the dispute is, on the contrary, verbal, not metaphysical. We thought that we were
talking about the metaphysical nature of reality - tables, chairs, numbers, propositions, free will,
etc. But now, if the deflationist has been successful, we’ve been shown that the dispute is really
about language, how we use our terms, how we define our concepts, etc. It is about words, not
the world. Yet, as we are beginning to see, ontological debates about the mind are importantly
different. The very mentalistic activities under scrutiny are presupposed in our (usual)
understanding of what a verbal dispute is. So to point out that two disputants discussing
ontological issues about mentality is merely verbal is not to give a diagnosis of the activity free
from the issues under scrutiny. Diagnosing a dispute as merely verbal presupposes the very
notions under dispute. Are there beliefs? Are there meanings? Do we have mental attitudes
towards propositions? If a verbal deflationist says ‘yes’ to all of these in order to show that the
particular debate is merely verbal, then this is to assume that eliminative materialism is false.
This is not deflationary; this is to take an ontological stance. Moreover, it’s to take an ontological
stance on an issue that, according to the verbal deflationist, is verbal and not ontological. So it is
non-deflationary and circular. Thus, the only available move for the deflationist is not to take an
ontological stance - i.e., not to assume the legitimacy of folk psychological discourse. But then
her diagnosis of the debate as merely verbal cannot gain traction. This is cognitive collapse.20
Hirsch himself does not, in fact, include ontological debates about the mind in his deflationary
criticisms. Why not? He doesn’t say. In light of the looming threat of cognitive collapse, we now
see the importance of having a principled division between debates that are subject to verbal
deflationary critiques and those that are not. Yet it’s hard to see where any verbal deflationist
will be able to draw the line. The verbal deflationist, like the framework deflationist, is under
pressure to say more, or at least re-describe the activities and behavior involved in a verbal
dispute such that it is not subject to cognitive collapse. But it is difficult to see how this will be
possible for a meta-ontological deflationary view since by design they do not take an ontological
stance. As such, these worries seem particularly challenging for the deflationist in ways that it
isn’t for serious ontological views, such as mental fictionalism.
I still have not explicitly said why cognitive collapse worries are systematic for meta-ontological
deflationary views applied to philosophy of mind. Let us discuss one more deflationist position,
20 Thanks to Ted Parent for comments here.
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Thomasson’s (2017) metalinguistic negotiation thesis, and then we’ll back up to look at the
bigger picture.
iv. Metalinguistic Negotiations and Disputes about Mentality
While not mentioned explicitly above, Hirsch launches two complaints against revisionary
ontological disputes: (i) that the two ontologists are not really disagreeing, and hence are
talking past each other, and (ii) that neither disputant is speaking the language that ordinary
speakers are using (English) and hence, that the ontologist and the ordinary speaker are not
really disagreeing, and hence are talking past each other. In each case, Hirsch is inferring from
(a) to (b):
(a) Two speakers, X and Y, mean different things by the words they are using.
(b) Thus, X and Y are not expressing genuine disagreement; it is merely a verbal (trivial)
debate.
However, the legitimacy of inferences from (a) to (b) has recently come under criticism. Plunkett
and Sundell (2013) challenge Hare’s (1991) argument from disagreement to semantic
univocality with respect to normative and evaluative terms, which runs roughly as follows:
“If X says that helping others is good, and Y says that helping others is not good, then X
and Y genuinely disagree. But if X and Y genuinely disagree, then they must mean the
same thing by ‘good’.”
But such an argument is an example of the following inference, which is the contrapositive of (a)
to (b):
(c) An exchange between two speakers, X and Y, expresses genuine disagreement.
(d) Thus, X and Y mean the same things by the words they are using.
Against these inferences, Plunkett and Sundell claim that very often substantive disagreement is
metalinguistic, involving what they call metalinguistic negotiation. If they are right, two
speakers can be engaged in substantive debate, even though they mean different things by their
words, because (say) they are implicitly arguing about which is the better language. If implicit
disagreement about which language is better qualifies as substantive disagreement, then one
cannot move from (c) to (d), nor from (a) to (b). Even if we admit that two serious ontologists
mean different things by the words that they are using, such disputants can still be in a genuine
disagreement.21
21 This point not only cuts against verbal deflationists such as Hirsch, but any others who argue from (a) to (b) or (c)
to (d). Siddelle (2007), for example, says “One reason I think verbal disputes are so common is that when I look, I
seem to keep finding them! It so often seems that there is a charitable interpretation according to which the claim
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Following Plunkett and Sundell, let us characterize a canonical dispute as one where speakers
disagree over the literal content of what is said, and thus disagree about the truth value of the
propositions literally expressed. Plunkett and Sundell do not deny that there are canonical
disputes; they deny that a dispute must be canonical in order for there to be genuine
disagreement. They maintain that there are many instances of non-canonical disputes,
metalinguistic negotiation being one among them.
Consider the following dialogue:
(1)
(a) There is one proton in the nucleus of a helium atom.
(b) No, there are two protons in the nucleus of a helium atom.
Speakers (1a) and (1b) cannot be in a canonical dispute, since having two protons in a nucleus is
consistent with having one. The explicit content of (1a)’s statement, in other words, involves a
claim that there is at least one proton, which is consistent with there being two protons. But
given how we commonly use count statements, (1a) pragmatically conveys that there is exactly
one proton in the nucleus of a helium atom, whereas (1b) pragmatically implies that there are
exactly two. So the explicitly conveyed content is compatible, but the pragmatically implied
content is not. Granting that the communicative upshot of most exchanges is a combination of
explicit semantic content and pragmatically implied content, it is plausible that speakers
non-canonically disagree. That is, the inconsistent content between the speakers is whatever is
expressed implicitly and pragmatically, not explicitly and semantically. But if so, then this
suggests that quite often (or often enough) disputes are non-canonical.
For comparison, consider the following exchange:
(2)
(a): Waterboarding is torture.
(b): Waterboarding is not torture.
We can imagine that (2a) and (2b) agree on certain relevant facts: what waterboarding is, what
happens to an individual subjected to it, etc. Suppose, however, that (2a) defines ‘torture’ as
“any act inflicting sever suffering, physical or mental, in order to obtain information or punish,”
whereas (2b) defines ‘torture’ as “any such act inflicting pain rising to the level of death, organ
of each party doesn't conflict with that of the other.” (2017: 86). Sidelle is assuming here that because the semantic
content of two disputants is compatible, they must be having a merely verbal, non-genuine dispute. If Plunkett and
Sundell are right, however, this kind of common inference is undermined: absence of conflict over the literal
content of what is said does not exclude genuine disagreement between speakers.
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failure, or the permanent impairment of a significant body function.” Then both (2a) and (2b)
speak truly.  But if (2a) and (2b) accept different definitions of ‘torture,’ there is a sense in which
their debate is verbal: they disagree how a certain word should be used or defined. But that
does not mean that their debate is merely verbal, in the pejorative sense in which the charge is
often intended. And it certainly does not mean that their debate is not worth having. The
speakers in (2) do not explicitly contradict one another, yet they pragmatically imply
inconsistent content. In the context of policy-making, for example, (2b) implicitly endorses
waterboarding as a tactic for acquiring information or to punish, whereas (2a) opposes it. These
are inconsistent positions that will likely have very tangible outcomes in law-making, moral
accountability, etc. Thus, we have an example of a debate where (i) the speakers do not mean
the same thing by their words, yet (ii) they are having a substantive disagreement (Plunkett and
Sundell 2013).
This suggests a meta-ontological deflationary alternative to framework and verbal dispute
deflationism. Building off of this suggestion, Thomasson (2017) proposes that certain debates
do, in fact, hinge on important linguistic matters (see also Belleri 2017). Understanding serious
ontological debates in this way reveals them to be genuine pragmatic disagreements, not
substantial metaphysical disputes. This deflationist diagnosis of what the serious ontologists are
doing does not render their activity pointless. But it is, nonetheless, a deflationist option. It’s a
way of understanding how it is that the serious ontologist is doing something other than they
take themselves to be doing, even if this other thing is important and worth doing. This is
metalinguistic negotiation deflationism.
To see how this will apply to serious ontological debates, consider the following exchange:
(3)
(a): The entire table is in the room.
(b): No, the entire table is not in the room.
Let us assume that the two speakers in (3) do not mean the same thing by ‘table’: (3a) defines
‘table’ as whatever it is that ordinary folk countenance as tables - things that look like tables,
function as tables, etc.; (3b) defines ‘table’ as ‘a particular trans-world mereological sum of
modal and spatio-temporal parts.’ Given this difference in meaning, (3a) and (3b) explicitly
convey compatible propositions. Nonetheless, they may reasonably implicitly convey
endorsement of their incompatible definitions. Their disagreement may be over which
definition or language is better, where the measure of ‘better’ depends on context. If the
speakers are in the ontology room, for example, and are trying to figure out how best to carve
up nature at its joints, avoid constitution puzzles, and so on, then (3b)’s definition may be
better. If we are figuring out whether we have successfully moved someone’s furniture from
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one room to another, (3a)’s definition may be better.
So again: we have an instance where (i) the speakers do not mean the same thing by their
words, yet (ii) there is nonetheless a substantive disagreement. Depending on the context, the
exchange in (3) may very well be important and worth having, even if the debate is also about
words and meanings - i.e., a verbal dispute. It’s just that it’s not merely verbal.
Could this kind of deflationism - metalinguistic negotiation - apply to otological debates in
philosophy of mind? Consider the following:
(4)
(a): Joe believes the sky is blue.
(b): No, Joe does not believe the sky is blue.
As before, we can imagine that speakers (4a) and (4b) agree on certain relevant facts: that Joe is
behaving in a certain way, that his brain is in a certain state, that he utters sentences like “I
believe the sky is blue”, etc. But let us also assume that the speakers have different definitions
of ‘belief.’ (4a) is an identity theorist who takes sentences of the form “x believes p” to be true
when x is in a certain brain state (or when the physical events and states of x’s brain are
thus-and-so). (4b) is an eliminativist who takes “x believes p” to be true only when there is
some non-scientific or dualistic entity involved. Given this difference, (4a) and (4b) explicitly
convey compatible propositions. But if they implicitly convey endorsement of their incompatible
definitions, then their disagreement is over which definition or language is better, for the
relevant purposes. If the speakers in (4) are in the ontology room, for example, and they are
trying to figure out how best to solve substance-dualist problems of interaction, then (4b)’s
definition may be better. If we are figuring out whether Joe perceives the world as many others
do, then (4a)’s definition may be better. Viewing the debate in this way shows how the speakers
in (4) may mean different things by their words, yet nonetheless disagree about which
definition is better for the relevant purposes.
Notice that, unlike verbal deflationism, there is no dismissal of ontological debates as trivial or
pointless according to this deflationist picture. In fact, Thomasson insists that one of the virtues
for the metalinguistic thesis is that it captures the fact ontologists take themselves to be doing
something important. In contrast, for all of Hirsch’s appeal to a charitable presumption of
speakers, the one group of speakers he fails to charitably interpret are revisionary ontologists
(Thomasson 2017; see also Hawthorne 2006). According to Hirsch, ontologists everywhere are
massively mistaken about what they are doing and how important it is: ontologists are not
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disagreeing, and that whatever it is they are doing is totally trivial.22 Metalinguistic negotiation
deflationism is a vast improvement on this front, for it does not interpret ontologists as doing
something utterly pointless. Nonetheless, it is uncharitable in another way: it claims that
ontologists are engaged in verbal disputes, even if it is granted that these verbal disputes are
important. This is still to grossly mischaracterize what the serious ontologists take themselves to
be doing.
Notice, too, that unlike framework deflationism where one interprets ontologists as asking
external theoretical questions, there is no charge here that certain ontological debates are
absurd or nonsensical. On the contrary, this proposal provides an explanation of how these
debates are quite coherent at the implied, pragmatic level. This could still be interpreted as an
expansion of Carnap’s framework diagnosis of external pragmatic questions, however; just not
external theoretical ones. Whether to adopt a certain framework, we might say, is akin to
endorsing a particular language or vocabulary. Insisting that this is the way to define ‘table’ or
‘beliefs’, for example, is much like giving practical reasons for endorsing one particular linguistic
framework over another. If this is right, then we now have a much more detailed account of
what might be involved in accepting a framework.
Even so, cognitive collapse awaits. Take a look again at the dialogue in (4) and the explanation of
what’s going on, according to the metalinguistic negotiation thesis. The description of two
disputants at the metalinguistic level crucially involves folk psychological notions: the speakers
mean different things by the relevant terms, they endorse one definition over the other, they
believe that one definition is better, where what counts as ‘better’ depends on contextual
features such as what they desire, what’s intended, what they aim to accomplish, etc. If we
assume that this description is accurate, then it assumes the legitimacy of the very entities at
issue. Again, we can imagine that an eliminative materialist would take the metalinguistic
explanation of what’s going on in (4) as directly question-begging against her view. So in order
for a metalinguistic deflationary explanation to get off the ground, it would have to assume that
there are, in fact, the very entities as circumscribed by folk psychology - i.e., that eliminative
materialism is false. But this is to take an ontological stance and beg the question against the
eliminativist, making it non-deflationary and circular. Thus, the only available move for the
deflationist is not to take an ontological stance - i.e., not to assume the legitimacy of folk
psychological discourse. But then her diagnosis of the debate as metalinguistic negotiation
cannot gain traction. This, yet again, is cognitive collapse.
22 “The issues being debated by revisionists are not deep; they are completely trivial…Revisionists suffer from the
illusion that certain questions are philosophically deep, inviting complicated theoretical debates, when in fact these
questions are comically trivial….The argument from charity is a last-ditch effort to bring the revisionists back to
their senses...so that they can recognize utter triviality when it stares them in the face.” (Hirsch 2011: 102)
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We might have thought that moving to the pragmatic, meta-linguistic level would be an
improvement on other deflationary approaches. But moving to the metalinguistic level still
carries with it the diagnosis that the ontologists’ disagreement is over words, not the world.
And this very diagnosis still presupposes the legitimacy of folk psychology. On pain of cognitive
collapse, the metalinguistic deflationist, just like the verbal and framework deflationist, is under
pressure to say more or at least re-describe the activities and behavior involved in giving a
metalinguistic analysis. But it is difficult to see how this will be possible for a deflationary view
since by design they do not take an ontological stance. This cognitive collapse makes for a
particularly formidable worry for the deflationist.
III. Deflationism, Collapse, and Mental Fictionalism
Let’s take stock. We’ve run through three meta-ontological views and applied them to
ontological debates in philosophy of mind. In each case, the meta-ontological deflationist
suggests a way to re-diagnose serious ontological debates about mentality. Yet, as we have
seen, this rediagnosis assumes the legitimacy of the very entities and activities under
consideration. This is why the cognitive collapse worries for meta-ontological deflationists are
systematic. When the defaltionary views are applied to debates about mentality, the
deflationary view includes descriptions of disputants who hold beliefs, have desires, make
assertions, etc. But this is to assume the legitimacy of folk psychology - the very thing at issue.
We cannot assume the legitimacy of folk psychology in order to deflate debates about the
legitimacy of folk psychology. If we did, it presumes an ontological stance and is circular. The
deflationist by design does not take an ontological stance; they are, presumably, providing an
explanation as to why there is no ontological stance to be had. But if a stance isn’t taken, the
deflationary critique suffers cognitive collapse.
Cognitive collapse worries are usually reserved for serious ontological views such as mental
fictionalism and eliminative materialism. The fact such worries arise for deflationism about
mentality is, itself, quite surprising and worth discussing. Yet even more surprising is the fact
that such cognitive collapse worries seem particularly problematic for deflationists. Because the
deflationist doesn’t take an ontological stance (she doesn’t think there is one to be had), she
doesn’t have the resources that, say, the mental fictionalist does. The mental fictionalist thinks
that, strictly speaking, something is going on when it seems as if we are engaging in folk
psychological behavior, including engaging with a fiction, so she will have plenty of resources at
her disposal to avoid cognitive collapse. The deflationsist does not.
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Now, true, as I’ve pointed out several times in this paper, not all deflationary views are
deflationary across the board. Not all deflationists are global deflationsists. Hirsch and
Thomasson, for example, do not in fact apply their deflationary criticisms to ontological debates
in philosophy of mind. They also both explicitly claim they do not intend for their deflationary
views to apply to all of metaphysics; they are local deflationists. So perhaps the cognitive
collapse worries I’ve raised are only a problem for global deflationists, not local ones. Or
perhaps collapse is only a problem for near-global deflationists - i.e., those who are deflationaist
enough such that any place where they 'touch down' and make substantive metaphysical claims
isn't substantive enough to get them out of cognitive collapse.23 In this way, perhaps local
deflationists will have some resources at her disposal to avoid collapse, just as the mental
fictionalist does.
Yet, as we’ve seen with Hirsch, allowing for some substantive metaphysical debates (and not
others) won’t help. Hirsch’s deflationary criteria on offer - despite being non-global - lands him
in cognitive collapse anyway. So endorsing a local deflationary position is insufficient for
avoiding collapse. Moreover, in Thomasson’s case, collapse doesn’t occur because of any
particular criteria provided, but because the entire deflationary proposal - the overall
explanation for why certain debates are deflationary - involves appeal to metalinguistic
negotiation. And metalinguistic negotiation (taken at face value) assumes the legitimacy of folk
psychological discourse, generating cognitive collapse. So it won’t matter if she allows that
some metaphysical debates are substantial and others are not; it’s the fact that the deflationary
proposal on offer is in principle inapplicable to mentality that is so problematic.
Moreover, it would surely be an unwelcome consequence that the coherence of an ontological
deflationary proposal depends on details of the non-deflationary portions of the view. If a
deflationary position is only as good (coherent) as it’s non-deflationary details, this should be
pretty alarming for deflationism generally. Whatever the deflationary position, however global
or local and whatever the details, the problem of collapse creates pressure for the deflationist
to say what he is not a deflationist about, on pain of incoherence. And whatever answer or
explanation is given, this should be worrying: realism is a pretty awkward place for a deflationist
to hang his hat.
So what? Can’t we just take the entire foregoing discussion as a reductio on the assumption that
meta-ontological deflationism can coherently be applied to ontological debates about
mentality? After all, and as I’ve admitted along the way, none of the deflationary views we
23 I don't know what that would be, but I can imagine cases: if a deflationist thought that the only substantive
metaphysical question is whether God exists or not, then this likely won’t be enough to get out of cognitive
collapse worries.
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examined are in fact applied to issues of mentality. If doing so yields cognitive collapse worries,
then the solution seems simple: don’t do that. Don’t apply meta-ontological deflationary views
to ontological debates in philosophy of mind. Got it. Let’s move on.
Not so fast. We cannot simply refrain from holding a deflationary view of an entire subcategory
of metaphysics because of the problems that would arise for the deflationists if we did. This
would be theoretically irresponsible (and dialectically suspect). The deflationist needs to
provide a principled division between those ontological debates that are subject to certain
deflationary critiques and those that are not. By principled, I mean a way of providing criteria
that avoids collapse but isn’t merely ad hocly designed to avoid collapse. Yet it’s hard to see
where any deflationist will be able to draw the line. At the very least, neither Hirsch nor
Thomasson presently provide us with such a criteria. And neither can merely rely on the fact
that their deflationary proposal was not intended to apply to debates about mentality. Given
the pressure of cognitive collapse, we are now in need of a full, non-arbitrary explanation of not
just why such views are in fact not applied to debates about mentality, but why they in principle
can not be. Why are ontological debates about mentality so resistant to such deflationary
critiques? How can we be sure that these collapse problems won’t infect other ontological
debates? At the bare minimum, our discussion here has put quite a bit of pressure on the
deflationists to say more - and, in particular, to say more about the non-deflationary details of
their view.
Moreover, whatever the deflationary responses are from here, establishing that certain
deflationary arguments cannot apply to ontological debates in philosophy of mind is a huge win
for non-deflationary views about the mind - including (and especially!) mental fictionalism. As I
said at the start, I am interested in serious ontologists who assume that what they are doing is
metaphysically important. It is very often because fictionalists assume that certain metaphysical
debates are substantial and worth doing that they are motivated to embrace the fictionalist
view that they favor. Fictionalism, however oddly, is one way to take ontology seriously. Yet
meta-ontological deflationary views offer substantial challenges to serious ontology by aiming
to undermine the assumption that the issue at hand is a serious ontological one. A deflationary
analysis of a particular debate - say, ontological debates in philosophy of mind - is an attempt to
undermine all of the relevant serious ontological positions, including mental fictionalism. So, if
any of the three deflationist views we’ve examined can be successfully applied to ontological
debates in philosophy of mind, then this would be a direct challenge to all relevant serious
ontological positions, including mental fictionalism. This is how a deflationary challenge for
debates about mentality is thereby a challenge for mental fictionalism. So if we’ve shown -
which I hope we have - that certain deflationary views can not, in fact, be coherently applied to
ontological debates about the mental, then this removes a whole class of (what would have
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otherwise been) substantial challenges for mental fictionalism. We will have shown how mental
fictionalism, along with other serious ontological views about mentality, has dodged a
considerable bullet.
Meanwhile, we have also shown how mental fictionalism has the resources to avoid cognitive
collapse worries, whereas certain mental deflationist views do not. While this may not show
that mental fictionalism beats out other serious ontological views about mentality, it certainly
shows how mental fictionalism has a solid foothold amid deflationary collapse.
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